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CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: PROPHET OF REFORM AND
REACTION
ROBERT J. HARRIS*
GENERAL THEORIES OF THE CONSTITUTION

Roger Brooke Taney's judicial career began and ended in controversy.' His appointment as Chief Justice in 1836 came not long after
his nomination to be Secretary of the Treasury had been rejected and
his nomination to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
had been indefinitely postponed because of his role as a central
figure in the great controversy between the Jackson administration
and the Bank of the United States. 2 These successive nominations
of Taney to high position evoked a flood of partisan invective against
him in an age which was hardly characterized by restraint. In the
course of time, however, Taney was able to win for himself a strong
position in the esteem of his fellow citizens, but he lost this position
as a result of his opinion in the unfortunate Dred Scott case.3 After this
decision he was denounced with every opprobrious epithet which
malignant righteousness could contrive. 4 The fluctuations in Taney's
public reputation continued even after his death, but a century after
the decision of the Dred Scott case his position in American constitutional history was secure.
Taney's standing as a Chief Justice is second only to that of Marshall, and this standing is due to a number of factors. First, Taney
served for a very long time as Chief Justice, twenty-eight years,
longer than any other save Marshall. Second, Taney's immediate
successors as Chief Justice, Chase, Waite, and Fuller, were at best
mediocre, both as presiding officers of the Court and as jurists or
statesmen. Subsequent successors, with the possible exception of
Chief Justice Hughes, because of brevity of tenure or lack of talents, or
both, have not made any permanent imprint upon the Court as an
institution because of their office as Chief Justice; although two of
* Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
1. The best biography of Chief Justice Taney is SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY
(1935). A useful account of Taney's judicial opinions and political and constitutional theories is found in SMITH, ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSON JURIST (1936).
2. 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 285 (1924).
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4. 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25. After Taney's death Charles Sumner
declared: "The name of Taney is to be hooted down the pages of history....
He administered justice at last wickedly, and degraded the judiciary of the
country, and degraded the age." SwisHER, ROGER B. TANEY 581-82 (1935).
Sumner was opposing a bill to provide for placing a bust of Taney in the
Court room. It was finally placed there after the death of Chief Justice Chase
when Congress authorized an appropriation for the busts of the two Chief

Justices.
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them, White and Stone, must be reckoned with, but largely in their
capacity as Associate Justices. Third, during the twenty-eight years
he was Chief Justice, Taney was the dominant figure of a Court which
included such personalities as Joseph Story whose views became
eccentric with the reconstruction of the Court, John McLean whose
obsequiousness to presidential ambition led him to turn Whig and
then Republican, James Moore Wayne, the Georgia nationalist, and
John Catron, the Tennessee Democrat, to mention only some of
the more outstanding of Taney's associates. Finally, as the chief
of a comparatively homogeneous Court, despite fairly frequent dissents and separate concurrences, Taney had a clear-cut theory of
government and the role of the Court in it which he was able to
an impressive degree to imprint upon the Constitution and the Union
in important contributions, some of which have proved comparatively
permanent.
To a great extent Taney's constitutional views had been formed
prior to his becoming Chief Justice at the age of fifty-nine. Though
a Federalist originally, he was inclined toward agrarianism as befitted a member of the landed gentry of Maryland. His ideal of the
good society was that he had known in Maryland which was founded
upon an agricultural economy nurtured by slavery and supplemented
by light industry and exchange. His ideal form of government was
that which he regarded as existing under the constitution of 1789, a
confederation or union of sovereign states bound together by a written
constitution which was binding upon the states regardless of its nature
as a compact. The general government he regarded as one of limited
and express powers. The important units of government were those
of the states which had not only the right but the duty to govern
men and things within their dominion in such a way as to advance
the welfare of all. He was skeptical of all concentrations of power
and especially of economic power. These views, to be sure, were something of a paradox for even an agrarian Federalist who accepted
neither the constitutional nationalism of Hamilton, Marshall, and
Webster nor the particularism of the men of the Hartford Convention.
Accordingly, as his party died of inanition, Taney found a congenial
political home in the Jacksonian Democracy.
As Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury in Jackson's
cabinet Taney had opportunities on a number of occasions to give
official expression to his views on the Constitution, national and state
power, and the relationship of government to the economic order.
Although he personally deprecated the institution of slavery, he
accepted it as a necessary fact of social existence, and contended
in opinions rendered while Attorney General that slavery and the
status of slaves were matters exclusively within the powers of the
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states, even transcending the treaty power. In this respect, indeed, he
stated his views on the social and legal status of negroes in a manner
almost parallel to those enunciated in the Dred Scott case twenty-five
years later. 5 As architect of Jackson's policy on the Bank of the United
States Taney was articulate in his condemnation of the Bank's great
powers over creditors, other banks, and government itself, powers
"with which no corporation can be safely trusted in a republican government. ' 6 And in a letter to the President, designed to encourage
a veto of the bill to renew the Bank's charter, he contended that
"the continued existence of that powerful and corrupting monopoly
will be fatal to the liberties of the people. ' 7 In other ways he demonstrated an antipathy to bank currency closely similar to those of that
states rights agrarian and Jeffersonian publicist, John Taylor of Caroline.
The age of Jackson and of his coadjutors and successors was an age
both of reform and reaction. On the side of reform a great variety of
state legislation looked to the regulation of business corporations,
banks, insurance companies, issues of stock, the amelioration of labor,
the emancipation of women, the prohibition of intoxicants, and the
further democratization of government through the extension of the
suffrage and the popular election of state executive and judicial
officials. However, the ominous rumblings of the slavery controversy
cast a long and deepening shadow over the land, particularly after the
Nat Turner slave insurrection in 1831, and a pall of reaction descended
upon many of the slave states in the form of legislation repressive of
slaves, free negroes, and whites. These in turn were accompanied by
fugitive slave laws, personal liberty laws in the North, and the rising
tide of abolitionism, all of which tended to create an atmosphere of
unreason and to tear asunder not only the party of Jackson and
Taney but the Union as well. In the meantime, in one way or another,
many of the issues pertaining to reforms and slavery were to come to
the Supreme Court of the United States for adjudication on constitutional questions, and it fell to the lot of Taney to play a paradoxical
role as the spokesman for the Jacksonian Democracy on the issues of
reform and the voice of reaction on the questions arising out of slavery.
Regardless of the apparent inconsistency of these roles Taney was
able to bring to the resolution of perplexing questions a consistent
body of constitutional theory.
First of all Taney and his Court, though not overtly reversing Chief
Justice Marshall's conception of implied federal powers and liberal
constitutional interpretation, were inclined to take a more literal view
5. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 150-55 (1935).

6. Id. at 166.
7. Id. at 228.
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of the Constitution and national powers than that prevailing during the
tenure of the great Chief Justice. In the Dred Scott case8 Chief Justice
Taney declared that changes in public opinion regarding the unfortunate status of negroes should not induce the Court to give the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was adopted. The way to change
the Constitution is through amendment and until altered "it must be
construed now as it was understood at the time of its adoption." Then
he went on to say of the Constitution: "It is not only the same in words,
but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the
citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks
not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent
with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers,
and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States."9
Any other rule of interpretation, he contended, would abrogate
the judicial character of the Court and render it a mere reflex of
public opinion and popular passion. However, the question arises,
how are the intent and meaning of the framers to be determined?
Taney's answer is that they are to be determined by recourse to the
language of the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of
Confederation, the plain words of the Constitution, state and congressional legislation, preceding, contemporaneous with, and following the adoption of the Constitution, and uniform action of the executive department. All this, of course, is a considerable departure from
Marshall's sentiment that the Constitution was "intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs."'1°
Equally remote from Marshall's conception of the Constitution as
the product of the whole people of the United States, is Taney's view
of it as the work of thirteen sovereign states. This view rests upon
the historical fiction enunciated in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell" that
when the Revolution succeeded "the people of each State became
themselves sovereign" and succqeded to all the rights, privileges, and
powers of the British Crown. Nor did they cease to be sovereign upon
the ratification of the Constitution. With the exception of the powers
8. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
9. Id. at 426.

10. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366. 410 (1842). The dicta in this case and Pollard's
ILessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), were heavily relied upon by
California, Louisiana, and Texas in the cases involving the ownership and
control of oil in the Tidelands Oil cases. United States v. California. 332
IU.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
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surrendered by the Constitution "the people of the several states are

absolutely and unconditionally sovereign within their respective territories" with full power to tax persons and things within their respective territories. 12 These statements, to be sure, are little more than
obiter dicta hardly necessary to the points actually decided, but they

do manifest an overriding solicitude for states rights even though they
more nearly resemble the Madisonian conception of divided sovereign-

ty than Calhoun's league of sovereign states.
Taney's conception of dual sovereignty and dual governments oper-

ating within the same territory permeated his constitutional theory
generally and his ideas on federalism in particular. In Taney's outlook
federalism was hardly harmonious in that it involved frequently re-

curring conflicts between angry and rival sovereignties mitigated
by the benign influence of adjudication by a judicial system that was
the creature of neither sovereignty and hence above the strife and

conflict of jealous governments in their competition for power. As the
arbiter between the Nation and the states it was equally the duty of
the Court to maintain national supremacy in its proper place and to
protect the states in turn from federal encroachment upon their
powers which by their own force limited federal powers and national
supremacy in this bellum omnium contra omnes between sovereignties.
COURTS AND JUDICIAL POWER
Chief Justice Taney's conception of judicial power and the role of
the courts flowed naturally from his doctrine of a truculently competitive federalism. Unlike Marshall who looked upon the federal
judiciary and the Supreme Court in particular as an organ for
maintaining national supremacy, expanding national power, and restraining state authority, especially when it adversely affected the
vested interests of property, Taney regarded the Supreme Court as an
impartial umpire between the rival sovereignties of state and nation
which existed outside and beyond the national government. This conception of the role of the Court is well articulated in the great case
of Ableman v. Booth 3 which, despite its nationalistic overtones, is
strictly in the tradition of dual federalism. Here. he sustained for a
unanimous Court the power of the Supreme Court of the United
States to review proceedings of state courts and held that a state court
has no authority to release on habeas corpus proceedings a prisoner
held in federal custody or to assume final authority to pass upon the
validity of an act of Congress in language that is reminiscent in part
of the opinions of Story and Marshall respectively in Martin v. Hunt12. Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854).
13. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
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er's Lessee 4 and Cohens v. Virginia.15 Though sovereign within its
limits, Wisconsin's sovereignty, he declared, is limited by the Constitution of the United States. "And the powers of the general government,
and of the state, although both exist and are exercised within the same
territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting
separately and independent of each other within their respective
spheres."16
The main purpose of the Constitution, he declared, was "to secure
union and harmony at home," and to do this it was necessary that
many rights of state sovereignty be ceded to the Union, and that in its
sphere of action "it should be strong enough to execute its own laws
by its own tribunals, without interruption from a state or from state
authorities." The supremacy conferred upon the national government
"was clothed with judicial power, equally paramount in authority to
carry it into execution" and afford a uniformity of judicial decisions
upon cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States. 17 Had Taney stopped here he would have been following
the reasoning of Marshall and Story rather closely, but he went on to
assert that the judicial power was indispensable not merely to national
supremacy "but also to guard the states from any encroachment upon
their reserved rights by the general government." Because internal
tranquility between the nation and the states was regarded as impossible without "such an arbiter" as the Supreme Court every precaution
was taken to fit it for its high duty. Accordingly, he asserted:
It was not left to Congress to create it by law; for the states could hardly
be expected to confide in the impartiality of a tribunal created exclusively by the general government without any participation on their part.
...This tribunal, therefore, was erected, and the powers of which we
have spoken conferred upon it, not by the Federal government, but by
the people of the states, who formed and adopted the government....
And in order to secure its independence, and enable it faithfully and
firmly to perform its duty, it engrafted it upon the Constitution itself, and
declared that this court should have appellate power in all cases arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So long, therefore,
as this constitution shall endure, this tribunal must exist with it, deciding
in the peaceful forms of judicial proceeding the angry and irritating
controversies between sovereignties, which in other countries have been
determined by the arbitrament of force.18

The net effect of the Taney Court's theories of federalism and the
conception of the Court as an arbiter between clashing sovereignties
14. 14U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
15. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
16. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 516 (1859).
17. Id. at 517.
18. Id. at 521. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), for a
similar attempt by the Wisconsin courts to challenge federal power.
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was to increase the judicial power and especially that of the Supreme
Court, for it meant that in addition to enforcing national supremacy
the Court would police the no-man's land between the nation and the
states and apply the Tenth Amendment inflated beyond its historical
significance to alleged federal encroachments upon states rights. In
other ways, too, Chief Justice Taney and his Court contributed to the
expansion of federal judicial power. This is notably true of Propeller
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh'9 in which Taney rendered one of his
better opinions. Here in a bold and creative stroke the Court rejected
the restrictive English rule of admiralty jurisdiction in favor of one
more suited to the geography of the United States, technological developments in transportation and the growing commerce on inland
waters. In so doing the Court reversed its ruling announced by Marshall in the case of The Thomas Jefferson20 where admiralty jurisdiction was confined to the high seas and upon rivers as far as the ebb
and flow of the tide extended in conformity with the English rule, and
upheld an Act of Congress of 1845 which extended the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts to the inland navigable waters of
the United States beyond the ebb and flow of the tide. In justifying this
result Chief Justice Taney pointed to the differences between English
and American geography which rendered the principle of the ebb and
flow of the tide adequate for England and the original thirteen states
but inapplicable to the United States as it had grown territorially with
its vast stretches of rivers and lakes comparable to inland seas as a
result of the invention of the steamboat which overcame the resistance to upward passage of unchanging currents. Moreover, admiralty
jurisdiction was found necessary both to the safety and convenience
of commerce and the administration of the laws of war. Finally, as a
concession to the states, in an opinion which significantly expanded
national legislative and judicial powers, Chief Justice Taney found
the new rule necessary to the preservation of the principle of state
equality, for without a change in the rule the newer inland states
would be denied the benefits of admiralty jurisdiction enjoyed by the
coastal states. The opinion and reasoning of the Chief Justice in the
Genesee Chief represent the judicial process at its best in the fusion
of legal history and principles with the raw materials of national
needs, environmental factors, and subsequent political developments
in national and commercial expansion in a manner that was both
21
creative and conservative, bold and yet traditional.
19. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).

20. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).

21. The result in the case of the Genesee Chief was anticipated in part in
Waring v. Clark. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847), where the Court qualified
the rule in The Thomas Jefferson by holding that the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts was not limited by English rules of admiralty. This
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Two other cases 'expanding the federal judicial power during the
Taney period are worthy of notice. In Swift v. Tyson2 Justice Story,
for a majority of the Court and with Taney's silent concurrence, rendered an opinion which held that in commercial matters in diversity
of citizenship cases the federal courts were not bound by state court
decisions, but rather by the general principles of jurisprudence. This
holding, which was designed to produce a uniformity of decisions on
matters of a commercial nature, resulted in even greater diversity
and confusion and represented a considerable increase in federal
judicial power because in. the absence of congressional legislation it
meant that the federal courts would formulate the rule of decision
in cases of a commercial nature loosely and broadly construed. 23 Later
Chief Justice Taney opposed the extension of the formula in Swift v.
Tyson.24 Taney was ill during most of the 1844 term and did not participate in the hearing and decision of Louisville, C. & C. R.R. v. Letson.25
The case is important both as an extension of federal jurisdiction and
as illustrative of the ability of the Taney Court to accommodate itself
to the exigencies of corporations. An earlier case26 had ruled that the
citizenship of a corporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction followed that of the individual shareholders. This rule combined with
that of another case 27 to the effect that in diversity proceedings all the
persons on one side of the suit had to be citizens of different states
from all persons on the other side was making it progressively more difficult for corporations to docket cases in the federal courts at a time
when corporations were becoming more important as economic units
in the national economy and the dispersal of stock owners on an interstate basis was becoming more general. The Letson case reversed the
rule governing the citizenship of corporations and established the
principle that the citizenship of a corporation for diversity purposes
is to be determined by the state of incorporation and thereby opened
the federal courts to corporate refugees from hostile state courts.
case extended admiralty jurisdiction to a boat collision on the Mississippi
River ninety-five miles above New Orleans. Taney's intense interest in
federal admiralty jurisdiction is reflected by his dissent in Taylor v. Carryl,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 583, 600 (1858), where he argued that the principle of
judicial comity should not be extended to a conflict between a federal court
sitting in admiralty and a state court on the ground that the admiralty
power was superior. In respect to admiralty jurisdiction, Tanev was a
pronounced nationalist and was as solicitous for admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States as Lord Stowell was in England.
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). For an excellent account of the consequences
of Swift v. Tyson, see

WENDELL, RELATIONS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

113 (1949).
23. Ibid. See also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED 60405 (Corwin ed. 1953).
24. Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464 (1845).
25. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
26. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
27. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

,1957 ]

ROGER BROOKE TANEY

Not all of the decisions of the Taney Court had the effect of expanding judicial power. By expanding the "political question" concept
Chief Justice Taney indeed prepared the way for removing many
issues from judicial determination and for placing some clauses of the
Constitution beyond the power of the court to read. In doing this he
created, so to speak, a kind of judicial index librorum prohibitorum.
The first great expansion of the political question concept came in the
leading case of Luther v. Borden 8 where the Chief Justice delivered
the opinion of the Court holding that the question of the lawful
government in Rhode Island and the corollary issue of what is a
republican form of government as a consequence of Dorr's Rebellion
were political questions for Congress and the President, and not for
the courts to determine. Chief Justice Taney referred to the difficulties
of courts in obtaining testimony upon which to decide such issues, the
possibility of conflict with the President, and the ensuing anarchy
which would result. On such issues, the courts, he concluded, were
therefore bound to take notice of the decisions of the political branches
of government and to follow them. In two other cases in which Taney
spoke for the Court the concept of political question was extended to
the recognition of foreign governments2 and the effect of written
declarations annexed to a treaty at the time of ratification.30 Similarly,
in his dissent in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts3' he took a restrictive
view of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and contended that
a boundary dispute between two states which involved sovereignty
and jurisdiction as distinguished from property was a political question.
By a vigorous and technical construction of the term "cases and
controversies" Chief Justice Taney contributed not only to a contraction of the federal judicial power but also to a prolonged confusion
concerning the types of proceedings the lower federal courts could
hear and the Supreme Court could review. Building upon the foundations laid in Hayburn's Case32 which held that the federal courts cannot perform non-judicial functions and another principle to the effect
that they cannot render advisory opinions, Chief Justice Taney as
33
spokesman for the Court in United States v. Ferreira
went farther
to hold that the duty imposed by an act of Congress upon a territorial
court to examine and adjudicate claims of Spanish subjects against
the United States and to report its decisions and evidence thereon to
28. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
29. Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852).
30. Doe ex dem. Clark v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1854).
31. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 752 (1838). See also his dissent in the last
installment of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 591, 639 (1846).
32. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).

33. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
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the Secretary of the Treasury who was to pay the claims if satisfied
that they were just and within the terms of the treaty with Spain was
non-judicial and hence beyond the power of the Supreme Court to
review upon appeal. Although he regarded the duty imposed upon the
Court and the Secretary as judicial in nature, it was not judicial "in
the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the
courts of the United States." Had the Chief Justice stopped here, he
would have done no more than confirm the existing law, but he went
on to declaim that "the duties to be performed are entirely alien to
the legitimate functions of a judge or courts of justice" and to imply
that an award of execution is an essential element of the federal
judicial power.
In Taney's last judicial utterance, Gordon v. United States,.4 this implication was expressed with dogmatic finality. The case involved the
act creating the Court of Claims which provided for appeals to the
Supreme Court after which final judgments in favor of claimants
were to be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for payment out
of any general appropriation made by Congress for the payment of
private claims. Because the act made execution of the judgment of the
Court of Claims and of the Supreme Court dependent upon future
action of the Secretary and Congress, Taney regarded it as nothing
more than a certificate of opinion to the Secretary and in no sense a
judicial judgment. Congress was accordingly without authority to
require the Court to take appeals from an auditor and to express an
opinion upon a case in which its judicial power could not be exercised,
in which its judgments would not be final and conclusive upon the
parties, and in which processes of execution could not be awarded to
carry judgments into effect. "The award of execution," he concluded,
"is a part and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial powers. It is no judgment in the legal sense of the
term without it."' This confusion of finality of judgment and an award
of execution was incorporated into many subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, 36 and until 1927 consequential relief was regarded as an
essential element of judicial power so as to render declaratory proceedings in state courts unreviewable by the Supreme Court and to
withdraw significant types of proceedings entirely from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Fidelity Nat'l Bank v. Swope37 the Court
finally took the position that an award of execution "is not an indis34. The case as finally decided in 1865 after Taney's death is reported in 69
U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864). Taney's opinion was published as an appendix
in 117 U.S. 697 (1886).
35. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1886).
36. See, e.g., In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222 (1893); Frasch v. Moore. 211 U.S.
1 (1908); Muskrat v. United States. 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Postum Cereal Co.
v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
37. 274 U.S. 123, 132 (1927).
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pensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial function" and thereby
cleared a constitutional path for the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.
Chief Justice Taney's Puritanical conception of the judicial function
also led him to excoriate a feigned controversy designed to elicit a
Supreme Court opinion in Lord v. Veazie.
STATE POWER AND THE CONTRACT CLAUSE

The outstanding contribution of Chief Justice Taney and the Court
over which he presided was the emancipation of state power from the
shackles forged for it by the Marshall Court in defense of vested interests of property and contract. This emancipation was begun during
the first term of court over which Taney presided in his great opinion
in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.39 Here the Court held that
authorization of the construction of a bridge across the Charles River
which ultimately was to become a free bridge while the charter of
a toll bridge nearby had many years to run was no impairment of the
obligations of a contract in reasoning which lashed at monopoly and
special privilege. With a degree of contempt appropriate to a member
of the landed gentry toward trade he quoted approvingly an English
case 40 to the effect that in "a bargain between a company of adventurers and the public ... any ambiguity in the terms of the contract,
must operate against the adventurers, and in favor of the public," and
the adventurers can claim nothing that is not clearly given. 41 In other
words franchises, grants, and charters will be strictly construed and
special privileges will not be deemed to be conferred by implication.
This is so because "the object and end of all government is to promote
the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established, and it can never be assumed that the government intended to
42
diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created."
He then pointed to the United States as a country which was "free, active, and enterprising, and continually advancing in numbers and
wealth" so that new channels of transportation and communication
were necessary. Progress in communication and transportation should
not be obstructed by legal rules vesting exclusive privileges in existing facilities. Otherwise we should be "thrown back to the improvements of the last century" and obliged to stand still until the claims
of turnpike companies are satisfied and they are ready to permit
38. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 25 (1850). Despite his tendency to exalt judicial

power Taney lent his concurrence to the decision in Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 236 (1845), which upheld a broad power of Congress to regulate the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
39. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
40. Stourbridge Canal Co. v. Wheeley, 2 Barn. & Adol. 792, 109 Eng. Rep.
1336 (K. B. 1831).

41. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 544 (1837).
42. Id. at 547.
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the states "to avail themselves of the lights of modern science and to
partake of the benefit of those improvements which are now adding
to the wealth and prosperity, and the convenience and comfort, of
'43
every other part of the civilized world.
This faith of Chief Justice Taney in reform and material progress
was paralleled in West River Bridge Co. v. DiX4 where Justice Daniel
in the opinion of the Court in which Taney silently concurred declared
that "the tenure of property is derived mediately or immediately from
the sovereign power of the political body" and there is "nothing peculiar to a franchise which can class it higher, or render it more sacred
than other property." All property, he continued, is held subject to
"the paramount power and duty of the State to promote and protect
the public good." The principles of the CharlesRiver Bridge case were
subsequently applied by Taney to hold that a state's taxing power was
unaffected by the consolidation of two corporations because one of
them enjoyed the privilege of tax exemption 4s and to refuse to extend
privileges of tax exemption conferred upon banks to insurance companies. 46 In this latter ruling Taney made his customary obeisances to
state sovereignty, took the position that no legislature could deprive its
successors of the taxing power, asserted that since the company's
charter contained no grant of a tax exemption it could not be implied,
and declared that every contract in a charter presupposes that some
consideration is given by the corporation that the community may
benefit.
Sweeping as these assertions are of state power unrestricted by the
contracts clause, they did not by any means destroy the utility of that
clause as a protection to contractual rights. In Bronson v. Kinzie,47 for
example, Chief Justice Taney as spokesman for the Court, invalidated
as applied to previous contracts an Illinois statute giving mortgagors
the right to redeem property within twelve months from its sale by
repaying the purchase money with ten per cent interest. Moreover,
the opinion was written in terms which would have won for the most
part the applause of John Marshall. To be sure the statute involved
contracts between private persons, but Taney concurred in the result
in the State Bank of Ohio case 48 where the Court invalidated an Ohio
tax on banks because it was different from a semi-annual tax of six
per cent on the net profits of banks in lieu of all other taxes as provided by the general banking act. Because the bank had been chartered
under the earlier statute the tax provisions were regarded as a con4. IrZ..qt .554.
44. 47 U.S. (6How.) 507, 534 (1848).
45. Philadelphia, W. &B. R.R. v. Maryland. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 376 (1850).
-46. Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854).
47. 42 U.S. (I How.) 311 (1843).

48. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).
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tract. Finally, Taney recognized that state court reversals of earlier
decisions in exceptional situations could impair the obligations of con49
tract as effectively as a statute.
The tenor of other decisions of the Taney Court affecting corporations demonstrate that the Chief Justice and his brethren were far
from being aggressively hostile toward corporations. Among these
decisions are those defining citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, 50 attempting to create a general commercial law for the whole
country,5 ' and extending the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts to all of the navigable waters of the United States, 52 all of which
are discussed elsewhere in this essay. One of the more significant cases
revealing the alertness of Taney to the needs of the business community is his opinion in Bank of Augusta v. Earle.0 Although Taney
and a majority of the Court refused to accord to corporations the
privileges and immunities of interstate citizenship and admitted on
the other hand that the laws of a state creating a corporation could
have no extraterritorial operation, with the result that a corporation
could "have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty
where it is created," they went on to hold that a corporation chartered
in one state could engage in business in another in the absence of clear
and express prohibitions to the contrary. This conclusion, was based
upon the assumption that the comity of nations bound the sovereign
states of the Union under the Constitution to a greater degree than
it could be presumed to bind foreign nations. The decision, to be sure,
left the states free to ban foreign corporations at their discretion and
in this respect was in keeping with the theme of state sovereignty so
often propounded by the Taney Court.
STATE POWER AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE

One of the most persistent and troublesome questions which confronted the Court from 1824 until 1851 was whether the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive of state power;
ahd, if not, to what extent the states could regulate such commerce.
The issue was avoided by the Marshall Court in Gibbons v. Ogden54
where the New York statute creating a steamboat monopoly was invalidated as being in conflict with an act of Congress rather than
being void per se under. the commerce clause over the protest of
Justice Johnson who argued that the power of Congress to regulate
commerce was exclusive. In Gibbons v. Ogden, too, Marshall referred
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854).
Louisville. C. &C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852).
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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to the "immense mass" of state legislative power to enact police legislation. The question was avoided again by the Marshall Court in
Willson v. Blackbird Creek and Marsh Co.55 by the holding that Delaware could authorize the construction of a dam across a small navigable creek in the absence of an act of Congress designed to control
navigation over small navigable streams. By the time Chief Justice
Taney ascended the Court, the conflict between the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce and the police power of the states had
been complicated by the lengthening shadows cast by the controversy
over slavery, and it is no exaggeration to say that the outlook of the
Taney Court in handling commerce cases was consciously or unconsciously conditioned by considerations of the possible impact of its
decisions upon slavery even in those cases in which slavery was not
involved.
The first case to reach the Taney Court invoking the commerce
clause and the police power was Mayor of New York v. Miln5G where
the Court, with Taney's silent concurrence, sustained a New York statute regulating ships coming into New York City in a manner designed
to discourage the immigration of paupers on the ground that the
statute was an internal police regulation and that persons were not a
subject of commerce. Justice Barbour, who spoke for the Court, went
on to invoke what he called the "undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
[of a state] over all persons and things within its territorial limits"'
unless restrained by the Constitution and to assert that "all those
powers which relate merely to municipal legislation or . . . internal
police, are not thus surrendered or restrained .... ,,57 In other words,

there is an area of state power which the commerce power cannot control and into which it cannot intrude. Ten years later the Court was
again confronted with the issue in the License Cases58 where the Court
sustained statutes of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
providing for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors under
license. Although the Court had no difficulty in agreeing upon the
result, the judges could not agree upon the reasons for it and there were
six separate opinions. Taney's opinion expressly assumed the existence of an internal traffic within each state which is separate from
and independent of interstate commerce, and hence within the power
of the state to regulate at its discretion and beyond the authority of
Congress to control. Although a state may "prevent the introduction
of disease, pestilence, or pauperism from abroad," these are not articles
of commerce. Spirits and distilled liquors are articles of commerce,
55.
56.
57.
58.

27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
Id. at 139.
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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and since Congress authorizes their importation, no state can prohibit
their introduction. However, he argued, the statutes in question did
not purport to prevent the importation of liquors except insofar as the
New Hampshire statute operated upon an import from another state
while still in the hands of the importer for sale and thereby subject to
federal control. Even so "the mere grant of power to the federal
government cannot ... be construed to be an absolute prohibition to
the exercise of any power over the same subject by the States." Hence,
a state may "for the safety or convenience of trade or for the protection of the health of its citizens, make regulations of commerce for
its own ports and harbors, and for its territory; and such regulations
59
are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress." In
other words, the states have a concurrent power to regulate commerce
and may exercise it not only in the absence of federal regulation, but
also in conformity with existing federal regulation. If a state regulation of commerce conflicts with an act of Congress, then such regulation must yield to the supremacy clause in Taney's view.
The inability of the justices of the Supreme Court to agree upon a
solution to the problem presented by the conflict between state power
and the commerce clause presented itself even more dramatically in
the Passenger Cases6° where the Court by a vote of five to four invalidated statutes of New York and Massachusetts levying taxes upon
immigrant aliens coming into their ports. Of the two statutes that of
Massachusetts was the more stringent in that lunatics, idiots, paupers,
and maimed, aged, and infirm persons could land only under bond as
security against their becoming public charges. The New York statute
also taxed at a lower rate American citizens from other states landing
in the state from vessels employed in the coastal trade. Justice McLean
argued that the commerce power of Congress was exclusive and
should be reaffirmed. Justices Wayne, Catron, McKinley, and Grier in
separate opinions thought such reaffirmation unnecessary. In dissent
Taney was joined by Justice Nelson, and Justices Daniel and Woodbury dissented in separate opinions.
Taney's dissent in the PassengerCases represents an extreme assertion of state authority at the expense of national power and national
supremacy. As regards aliens he contended that "the several States
have a right to remove from among their people, and prevent from
entering the State, any person, or class or description of persons, whom
it may deem dangerous or injurious to the interests and welfare of
its citizens: and that the State has the exclusive right to determine, in
its sound discretion. whether the danger does or does not exist, free
59. Id. at 579.
60. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
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from the control of the general government."6' 1 The power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce did not in his view prevent the sLates
from regulating it within their own territorial limits unless in conflict
with an act of Congress. Taney pointed to the selection of immigrants
by ship owners or masters, in many cases foreigners, and their possible
disposition to bring in the worst and most dangerous elements of the
population. He invoked the specter of a "mass of pauperism and vice"
flooding a state with "tenants from their almshouses or workhouses, or
felons from their jails" if Congress had the power attributed to it by the
Court. Although Congress in his opinion could regulate the transportation of passengers in foreign vessels, it could not compel a state to receive or retain persons who were regarded as dangerous to its peace or
the health of its citizens, or a burden upon its industrious citizens. In
any event, passengers were not imports and could be taxed. Despite
these grandiose assertions of state power, Taney thought the New York
tax on American citizens unconstitutional, and he even made a concession to nationalism. "For all the great purposes for which the
federal government was formed," he declared, "we are one people,
with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States;
and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as
in our own States." 62 This right he based upon the general rights of
citizens of other states as members of the Union, a firmer ground than
the Court has on occasion taken. 63
The question of the exclusive nature of congressional power over
interstate commerce was partially resolved in Cooley v. Board of Port
Wardens4 where Justice Curtis devised a formula which was approved by a majority of the Court including Taney. Under Curtis'
formula emphasis was shifted from the nature of the power exercised to the nature of the subject matter regulated so that matters
requiring uniform national regulation were subject to the exclusive
power of Congress to regulate commerce and those not requiring
it were subject to state regulation in the absence of congressional action. To be sure, the Taney court could not always agree upon
those matters requiring uniform and those subject to diverse regulation as manifested by the decision in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
61. Id. at 467.
62. Id. at 492. In his opinion for the Court in Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 169 (1861), Chief Justice Taney pronounced invalid a California tax
on bills of lading for shipment of gold and silver outside the state. The tax
was regarded as a tax on exports and was held to be indistinguishable from
the tax on imports in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
63. Reference is made to the bizarre opinion of Justice Byrnes in Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), where the right of an American citizen
to enter a state is rested upon the commerce clause rather than upon the
privileges and immunities of interstate or United States citizenship.
64. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
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Belmont Bridge Co. 65 A majority of the Court held invalid a Virginia statute which authorized the construction of a bridge across the
Ohio River. The bridge obstructed navigation to the harassment of
Pennsylvania which had expended large sums of money in canals
and railroads and which saw its investments jeopardized. Chief
Justice Taney and Justice Daniel dissented in separate opinions. The
Chief Justice reiterated his customary theme that in the absence of congressional regulation of the subject matter Virginia's authorization
of the bridge was a valid exercise of state power. Moreover, if the
authorization were an evil it could easily be corrected by Congress.
The failure of Congress to act did not in his belief warrant the judicial
power to "step in and supply what the legislative authority has
omitted to perform." 6
From Taney's doctrines concerning the commerce power a number
of propositions are explicit or implicit. First of all, there is the
principle, for a time followed by the Court, that the existence of the
states as political units possessed of reserved powers is a limit upon
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Second,
there is the assumption that there is a judicially definable line between what is interstate or foreign commerce and what is purely
internal commerce as distinct and separate entities. This assumption
in turn envisages commerce in terms of movement which has a beginning and an end, before and after which the states, and the states
alone, may regulate.67 Finally, even in the restrictive area of national
power the states have concurrent powers to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in the absence of any conflict with an act of Congress. In other words the commerce clause of its own force does not
preclude state action. Such theorems, it is unnecessary to state,
not only exalted state power at the expense of national authority,
but some of them rested upon a narrow and technical conception of
commerce inconsistent with the grand purposes of the commerce
clause and totally at variance with the realities of the economic order
in Taney's own age.
Taney's emphasis upon state power with the result either of weakening constitutional limitations or of minimizing national power is
shown in other opinions in which he spoke for the Court, concurred,
65. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852).
66. Id. at 581. Approximately two months later Congress enacted a statute
which set aside the decision in this case by declaring the bridge in question
to be no obstruction to navigation. The validity of this statute was challenged
in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856). The Court upheld the act as a valid regulation of commerce, and
Taney was with the majority. Justice McLean protested that Congress had
no power to annul a judgment of the Court. Justices Grier and Wayne agreed
with him on this issue, but concurred in the result reached.
67. For a good treatment of the tenth amendment as a limit to the com-
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(1936).
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or dissented. During the first term he presided over the Court he
joined the majority to sustain the power of Kentucky to authorize
a state chartered bank to issue notes despite the prohibition in the
Constitution against the emission of bills of credit by the states on
the technical ground that the notes were not issued upon the credit
of the state.68 The effect of the decision was obviously to vest in
the states a power to authorize a bank to do something they could not
do themselves. In dissent Justice Story invoked the memory and
views of Marshall in vain. In a brief concurring opinion in Groves v.
Slaughter69 Taney averred that the power over slavery and the introduction of slaves into their territory resided exclusively with the
states and their action upon this subject could not be controlled either
by virtue of the commerce power or any power conferred by the
Constitution. Taney's tendency to look upon the grant of federal
power as no prohibition of action by the states and to regard the
union of states as possessing an international character is illustrated
by his concurring opinion in Cook v. Moffat 70 where he reiterated the
rule contended for earlier by Justice Johnson, 71 to the effect that the
power of Congress to enact uniform bankruptcy laws is not exclusive.
He then proceeded to declare that bankruptcy laws of the states have
no force beyond their boundaries other than the respect and comity
which the established usages of civilized nations extend to the bankrupt laws of another. How far such comity should be extended in
his opinion was exclusively a matter for each state to determine
for itself in the absence of any authorization by the Constitution to
the federal courts to control them in this particular. Moreover,
federal courts when administering state law were bound to follow
the bankruptcy laws of the state in which they were sitting. A similar solicitude for state power is shown in Mager v. Grima,7 2 where a
unanimous Court speaking by the Chief Justice sustained a Louisiana
tax on legacies when the legatee was not a citizen of the United States
or domiciled within the state. The tax in question, he reasoned, was
nothing more than an exercise of the power possessed by every state
and sovereignty to regulate the manner and terms of inheritance.
Because every state or nation could refuse to permit aliens to inherit
property within its limits Louisiana could subject inheritance by
aliens to specified conditions. Seven years later this decision was followed in Prevost v. Greeneaux 73 where the same tax was sustained on
the ground that a subsequent treaty of 1853 with France accorded
French nationals the right to take or own property in the United
68. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
69. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 508 (1841).
70. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 309, 311 (1847).
71. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 271 (1827).
72. 49

U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850).

73. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 1 (1857).
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States if the laws of the states permitted it. Of greater significance
than the ruling is Taney's comment that a subsequent treaty could
not divest the state of rights of property under a tax law even if
it conveyed such an intention. In other words the power of the
states to regulate the holding or taking of property limits the treaty,
power and the power of Congress to provide minimum standards of
justice for the treatment of aliens.
NATIONAL POWER

Despite its preoccupation with preserving state power in any conflict with federal authority there are cases in which the Taney Court
sustained national supremacy. In many of these, to be sure, federal
power was sustained in a parsimonious manner in qualified language
so that the Court's enthusiasm for national power was hardly infectious. Even in Ableman v. Booth 4 federal judicial supremacy
was asserted in terms of dual sovereignty. In a few cases, however,
Taney was unqualifiedly on the side of federal power and national
supremacy. In Holmes v. Jennison,5 for example, the Court was
evenly divided on the question of whether the Governor of Vermont
could surrender a fugitive charged with murder to Canadian authorities. Joined by the nationalists, Story, McLean, and Wayne, Taney asserted that the power exercised by Vermont was a part of the foreign
relations of the United States and particularly of the treaty power.
The grant of power to the national government to conduct foreign
relations and to make treaties when combined with the prohibition
against the states' entering into any agreement or compact with a
foreign power effectively rendered the national treaty power exclusive.
Accordingly, any delivery of a fugitive to a foreign state would constitute an agreement or compact under the doctrine that the constitution has regard to substance and not form. He concluded by
pointing to the confusion and disorder which would flow from state
rendition of fugitives to foreign authorities and to the lack of any
advantage that would accrue to the states. Similarly, Taney gave his
tacit assent to Justice Wayne's opinion for a unanimous Court that
a Pennsylvania county could not levy a tax upon the office of a cap6
tain of a federal revenue cutter on grounds of national supremacy.7
The relatively unimportant question of whether Tampico became
a part of the United States within the meaning of the customs laws as
a result of its conquest and occupation during the Mexican War
arose in Fleming v. Page."" This afforded Chief Justice Taney an
opportunity to discuss the nature of the war power and the powers
74.
75.
76.
77.

62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 434 (1842).
50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850).
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of the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The
"genius and character of our institutions are peaceful," he said, "and
the power of Congress to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purposes of aggression or aggrandizement," but to
enable the general government to enforce its own rights or those of
its citizens by arms. Accordingly a war declared by Congress "can
never be presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest or acquisition of territory." Although the United States may extend its
boundaries by conquest, it can do so only by the exercise of the treaty
power or legislative authority. The President cannot annex territory
as commander-in-chief, because his powers in this respect are purely
military and relate only to the direction and employment of the
armed forces in such a way as he may deem most effectual to harass
and conquer the enemy.78 This restrictive conception of the war and
his respect for private property converged in Mitchell v. Harmony7
to lead Taney and a majority of the Court to limit the powers of military commanders to seize private property by holding that an army
officer cannot plead in his defense in a civil suit the illegal order of
a superior. Although admitting the power of the military to seize
private property to keep it from falling into the hands of the enemy
or to take it for public use with full compensation, in all cases "the
danger must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent
for the public service, such as will not admit of delay," and is not
justified just "to insure the success of a distant and hazardous expedition." It is the duty of the Court to determine the circumstances
in which private property may be taken by a military officer in
time of war, and the law does not permit it "to be taken to insure
the success of any enterprise against a public enemy which the commanding officer may deem it advisable to undertake."
In Jecker v. Montgomery,80 a third case arising out of the Mexican
War, Chief Justice Taney spoke for the Court which unanimously
held that neither the President nor any military officer could establish a prize court in a conquered country and authorize it to adjudicate
the claims of the United States or of private persons in prize cases
or to administer the law of nations. The decision was based upon
the principle that every court of the United States must derive its
jurisdiction and power from the Constitution or laws of the United
States under the clause in Article III which vests the judicial power
of the United States in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts
as Congress may ordain and establish. Accordingly, a tribunal
created in Monterey by a naval commander and sanctioned by the
President was held to be no more than an agent of the military power
78. Id. at 614.

79. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1852).
80. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1852).
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and in no sense a court of the United States with authority to
adjudicate prize cases.
With such conceptions of the war power and the authority of the
President as commander-in-chief, it was inevitable that Taney would
privately question the assumption of war powers by President Lincoln
during the Civil War and that he would officially challenge the
exercise of presidential power when the issue was properly presented
in a case. On April 27, 1861, as a consequence of disorders in Maryland
Lincoln ordered General Scott to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
if in his judgment the public safety required it. Soon afterwards an
active secessionist, John Merryman, was arrested upon military orders
and confined to Fort McHenry. A petition for his release in habeas
corpus proceedings was presented to Taney who issued the writ
directing General Cadwalader to bring Merryman before him for a
hearing. Cadwalader refused to do this until so ordered by the
President, whereupon Taney directed that an attachment be issued
against him, but then the military authorities refused to permit
the marshal to enter the fort in order to serve the writ. Taney then
wrote his opinion in Ex parte Merryman8l where he contended that
only Congress could suspend the writ of habeas corpus and strongly
denounced the President's action on the ground that the civil administration of justice in Maryland was unobstructed save for the
intervention of the military who in the circumstances could not
lawfully supersede the civil authorities. The principle that only
Congress can suspend the issue of the writ of habeas corpus and
then only in those areas where the civil courts are not open and
functioning was accepted by the Court soon after the Civil War
ended when guided by the afterthought that springs from the wisdom
of hindsight a majority of the justices celebrated the ritual that the
Constitution obtains in war as well as peace, once the war is ended.82
In other ways Taney expressed his opposition to what he regarded as
an arbitrary military despotism and looked forward to a peaceful
separation of North and South as "far better than the union of all
the present states under a military government, and a reign of terror
preceded too by a civil war with all its horrors, and which end as it
may will prove ruinous to the victors as well as the vanquished."8 3
Late in his career the Chief Justice wrote the opinion for the Court in
81. 17 Fed. Cas. 144, No. 9487 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
82. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304 (1946).
83. SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 554 (1935) (Letter to Franklin Pierce, June.
12, 1861). Interestingly enough is Taney's tacit concurrence with Justice Grier's;
opinion in the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863), which sustained the
President's power to meet force with force in the Civil War and to institutea blockade of Confederate ports in the absence of a declaration of war byCongress. Taney did dissent to the Court's decision concerning one of the
vessels condemned as prize of war.
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Kentucky v. Dennison8 4 which is representative of his views on national power as mitigated by the federal principle. The case involved
the refusal of the Governor of Ohio to surrender a fugitive from
Kentucky under the extradition clause of the Constitution as implemented by an Act of Congress of 1793. The language of the
Constitution and the statute is as imperative as the force of words can
be, but Chief Justice Taney held that the duty of a governor upon
whom a demand is made for the rendition of a fugitive from justice,
though mandatory, is a moral and not a legal obligation and hence
unenforceable either judicially or legislatively. The reasoning of
the opinion is interesting. It begins with a historical account of
extradition proceedings in the American colonies, under the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution of 1789. In this account Taney lays
down as historical truth the propositions that the thirteen colonies became separate and independent sovereignties by virtue of the Declaration of Independence and that the states preserved their sovereignty under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.
Moreover, the extradition clause in Article IV is regarded as a compact among these independent sovereignties and the Act of Congress
of 1793 as providing no means for compelling a state to perform the
moral-duty of surrendering fugitives from justice upon the requisition of other states. Nor does the Constitution arm the federal govern.ment with this power. "Indeed, such a power would place every state
under the control and dominion of the general government, even
in the administration of its internal concerns and reserved rights.
And we think it clear that the Federal government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose on a state officer, as such, any
duty, and compel him to perform it; for if it possessed this power,
it might overload the officer with duties which would fill up all
his time, and disable him from performing his obligations to the
state, and might impose on him duties of a character incompatible
85
with the rank and dignity to which he was elevated by the state."
All this seems to be a circuitous way of saying that the governor
of a state cannot refuse to surrender a fugitive from justice in extradition proceedings, but if he does, nothing can be done about it.
Such a line of reasoning not only runs counter to the "necessary
and proper" and "supremacy" clauses of the Constitution, but in
rendering the extradition clause totally impotent, it ran counter to
one of Taney's own cherished canons of constitutional interpretation.
This doctrine was that in expounding the Constitution "every word
must have its due force and appropriate meaning; for it is evident
that no word was unnecessarily used or needlessly added."86 The
84. 65 U.S. (24How.) 66 (1861).

85. Id. at 107.
86. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570 (1840).
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opinion, however, did conform to his conception of dual sovereignties
operating through the malfeasance of circumstance in only one
geographical area.
SLAVERY

Disasters of the magnitude of the Dred Scott case are neither born

of immaculate conception nor produced through spontaneous generation. Indeed, as regards the Dred Scott opinion, events and Supreme
Court decisions in some ways seemed to have been marching in step
to an inexorable tragic d6nouement. In the disposition of constitutional
issues arising from slavery Chief Justice Taney and his Court brought
to bear doctrines expounded in decisions having no direct relation
to the "peculiar institution," although references to slavery in some
of these opinions 87 lend partial support to the conclusion that the
Court devised such contrivances as dual federalism for the purpose of
handling slavery cases presented to it. In any event the doctrine of
state sovereignty which the Taney Court had used so effectively
to permit the states to embark upon social and economic reforms was
equally potent as an instrument for the protection of slavery and the
advancement of reaction.
In Groves v. Slaughter8 8 the opinion of the Court by Justice Thompson held that a provision of the Mississippi constitution prohibiting
the importation of slaves as merchandise after 1833 was not selfexecuting and that in the absence of implementing legislation contracts
to bring slaves into Mississippi for sale were valid. However, the
anti-slavery McLean, ever eager to decide issues arising out of slavery
on a broader basis than the case necessitated, wrote a concurring
opinion in which he pointed to the exclusion of slaves from the operation of the commerce clause by the compromise concerning the slave
trade and concluded that the power of slavery being local in character
belonged to the states. Such a power was necessary to them in order
to protect themselves against "the avarice and intrusion of the slave
'dealer" and to guard its citizens "against the inconveniences and
dangers of a slave population." The right to exercise this power he
placed "higher and deeper" than the Constitution and rested it
upon the law of self-preservation.8 9 This provoked Taney into writing
a brief concurrence in which he asserted that the power over slavery
was exclusively vested in the states and that slavery could not be
controlled by Congress under the commerce clause or any other provision of -the Constitution.
One of the more troublesome issues arising out of the slavery controversy was the question of national and state power over the
87. Notably, Taney's opinion in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282,

464, 474 (1849).

88. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).

89. Id. at 508.
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capture and return of fugitive slaves. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania9o the
Court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute relating to fugitive slaves,
and by implication all other statutes thereon, because the power of
Congress to enforce the provisions of the Constitution providing for
the surrender of escaped slaves was held to be exclusive and by its
own force to prohibit state action on the subject. In his opinion for
the Court Justice Story also intimated that it might be unconstitutional
to impose upon the states the obligation to enforce the duties of the
federal government. The nationalistic opinion of Story evoked protests from a strong minority of the Court who concurred in the result. Taney objected in particular to those portions of the opinion
holding the power of Congress over fugitive slaves to be exclusive
and implying that state officials were absolved from any duty to protect an owner's right to fugitive slaves. Justices Thompson, Baldwin,
and Daniel also took exception to the opinion. Justice Wayne concurred altogether with Story, and Justice McLean differed on only
one point, that concerning the lack of any obligation of the states to
enforce the fugitive slave law. Justices Catron and McKinley tacitly
concurred in Story's opinion. The plethora of opinions in the Prigg
case and the divergent reasoning expounded in them provoked
the acidulous John Quincy Adams with usual exaggeration to characterize the opinions as "everyone of them dissenting from all the
rest, and everyone coming to the same conclusion, the transcendent
in these United States, riveted by a clause
omnipotence of slavery
91
in the Constitution."
One fact that the Prigg decision did indicate was that the Court
was sharply and almost hopelessly divided over the issues arising
out of the slavery controversy whenever it went beyond the bare
necessities of the case to decide questions on a broader basis. The
case could readily have been settled upon the basis, which Story
himself discussed, that the Fugitive Slave Act superseded all state
legislation on the subject; and had that been done the Court undoubtedly would have been less divided despite the nationalistic
tendencies of McLean and Wayne to hold the powers of Congress
generally exclusive and hence prohibitory of state action. Whether
considerations of this nature influenced the Court is a matter of
rank speculation, but .eight years later the Court achieved a remarkable unity in a slavery decision with only two brief concurring
2
opinions. The case was Strader v. Graham,"
involving the status of
slaves who occasionally were carried by their masters into Ohio
temporarily and then returned to Kentucky. Speaking for the
Court, Chief Justice Taney pointed to the "undoubted right" of every
90. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
91. Quoted in 2 WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 359.

92. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 93 (1851).
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state "to determine the status, or domestic and social condition of

the persons residing within its.territory," except insofar as state power
may be limited by the Constitution. He found nothing in the Constitution to control the law of Kentucky upon this subject, and
concluded that the status of the negroes depended altogether upon the
laws of Kentucky after their return to the state. The Strader decision
by virtue of its confinement to the narrow issues presented in the
case pointed to a moral, but the justices either did not comprehend;
or if they comprehended they did not heed, with tragic consequences to
the country and the Court.
In most relevant respects the Dred Scott case resembled Strader
v. Graham. Like the slave musicians who had been taken to Ohio the
previously anonymous Dred Scott had also been taken by his master
from a slave state, Missouri, into free territory, first to Illinois for
approximately two years and then to Fort Snelling in the Territory
of Upper Louisiana for approximately two more years after which
his master returned to Missouri with Scott and his family. Ultimately
the Scotts were sold to Sanford who was close to the abolitionist
movement and consented to the bringing of friendly proceedings in
the state courts to determine Scott's status. The Supreme Court of
Missouri ruled that Scott was still a slave under the laws of the state.
Scott then brought a suit in the United States Circuit Court in
Missouri which decided his case in the same way. The only differences between Dred Scott's case and Strader v. Graham were: first,
that Scott had been removed to free territory for a longer period of
time than the minstrel slaves, and once into a territory of the United
States in which slavery had been prohibited by the Missouri Compromise; and, second, that he had brought suit subsequently in a
federal circuit court and thereby raised the issue of his citizenship.
Neither of these differences was sufficient to warrant a departure from
the manner used in disposing of the Strader case, but after a second
hearing the Court decided to determine the broader issue of Scott's
citizenship and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
The reasons for the Court's singular action in deciding the merits
of the Dred Scott case over which it had no jurisdiction are well
known, are outside the domain of constitutional law, and need no
detailed recapitulation. Suffice it to say that as the slavery controversy
grew in bitterness and intensity, it increased the hazards to the
political life expectancy of statesmen in and out of Congress. Accordingly an effective majority in Congress supported by ambitious
politicians outside was more than eager to shift the settlement of
the slavery dispute and the responsibility for it to the Supreme Court
under a policy of congressional non-intervention which was in-
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corporated into law by the Great Compromise of 185093 and the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854. 94 A few years later that uneasy and
inept politician, James Buchanan, as President-elect of the United
States was corresponding with two justices of the Supreme Court in
an effort to induce Justice Grier to join with other judges to settle
the slavery issue and take it out of politics.9 5 Moreover, Justice McLean whose flaming presidential aspirations were never snuffed by
lack of air in the judicial sanctuary made it known that he and
Justice Curtis would discuss the merits of the case in dissents, and
thereby in a sense provoked the other judges to answer them. It is
most probable, too, that Taney and his brethren actually believed
they could settle a political question within the framework of judicial
procedure. Finally, the action was perhaps but a logical culmination
to what had been an overweening solicitude for property in the
form of slaves even to the evisceration of national power. But
whatever the reasons, the majority of the Court abandoned its original
plan to dispose of the case on narrow issues and what was to have been
Justice Nelson's opinion for the Court based on Strader v. Graham
became only one in a series of six concurring opinions following that
of Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court.
In reaching the conclusion that Dred Scott was still a slave,
despite his nomadic wanderings as the servant of an army officer,
Chief Justice Taney laid down three propositions any one of which
was more important than the status of Dred Scott. The first was
that the negro was not a citizen of the United States or of any state and
could not become a citizen under the Constitution. In the second place,
Taney ruled that Congress had no power to regulate slavery in the
territories under a very narrow interpretation of congressional authority over territories generally. Finally, he dragged in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment by the scruff of the neck to assert
without further support that an act of Congress which deprived
a person of his liberty or property because he came or brought
his property into a territory of the United States "could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law."9 6 Aside from noting
93. 9 STAT. 446, 453 (1850).

94. 10 STAT. 277 (1854). The various proposals in Congress to leave to the
Court the settlement of the issue of slavery in the territories is well told in
Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered,38 MINN. L. REv. 16 (1953). See
also 2 WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 481-98; McLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 513-14, 520-22, 525-26, 540-50 (1935).

95. Catron wrote a letter to Buchanan suggesting that he "drop Grier a
line" concerning the necessity of settling the agitation over slavery. Buchanan
apparently did so, and Grier wrote to Buchanan a detailed account of how
the judges were to treat the case and showed it to Wayne and Taney. These
letters are reproduced in 3 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 2, 16-19. In his
inaugural address on March 4, 1857, Buchanan, who already knew what the
Court's decision would be, pronounced the issue of slavery in the territories "a
judicial question."
96. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450.
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that this was the first time that an official opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States expressly held the due process clause
to be a limitation upon legislative power no other comment is
necessary. The first two propositions are worthy of analysis because
of the labyrinthine reasoning underlying them.
To support his conclusion that a negro was not an could not be
a citizen of a state or of the United States Taney emphasized citizenship in terms of those persons who were citizens at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. This led him to make the frequently
distorted and misunderstood assertion that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution negroes were considered "as a subordinate
and inferior, class of beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant
race, and whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to
their authority, and had no rights- or privileges but such as those who
'9 7
held the power and the government might choose to grant them.
Taney then invoked English law, colonial legislation, and early state
statutes to argue that the negro was not a citizen of the United
States or of any state at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Much of the legislation cited bore little or no relevance to citizenship
including as it did prohibitions against miscegenation, requirements
for the registration of free negroes, prohibitions against the education
of negroes, and exclusion of negroes from the militia and the suffrage.
He also appealed to the texts of the Declaration of Independence, the
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution. The spurious nature
of these arguments was not neglected by the dissenters. Justice Curtis'
dissent is particularly relevant: first, for its emphasis upon the rule
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment that state citizenship was
primary and national citizenship secondary so that native born citizens
of a state were also citizens of the United States; and, second, for
his citation of laws showing that negroes were citizens of five states 98
and therefore citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution.
Having determined that Dred Scott was not a citizen and the
federal courts had no jurisdiction of the suit under that clause of
the constitution extending the judicial power to suits between citizens
of different states, Taney might have concluded his opinion; but
he and a majority of the Court were men with a mission. Hence,
they were dangerous, as men with a mission sometimes are when they
miscalculate the consequences of their acts. And lawyers and judges,
,of all people, insist most upon the principle that a man intends the
consequences of his acts. Accordingly, Taney proceeded with even
more spurious reasoning to decide the delicate issue of the power of
97. Id. at 404-05.
98. Id. at 572-89. The states were Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, and North Carolina.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

Congress to regulate slavery in the territories, an issue which most
judicious and ambitious politicians had avoided out of temerity,
prudence, or both.
To substantiate the conclusion that Congress has no general power
of legislation in territories of the United States Taney construed most
narrowly the power of Congress "to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States." This power, Taney argued, had
no connection with the general powers of legislation delegated to the
Federal Government, but was associated with a specified power
over movable property. Moreover, he argued that the term "rules
and regulations" was employed in contrast to general powers of legislation and therefore conferred no power upon Congress to prevent
a citizen from taking his property into a territory of the United
States. From this argument Taney proceeded to declare that Congress
had no constitutional power to acquire and maintain colonies to be
ruled at its own pleasure and no authority to enlarge its territorial
limits in any way except by the admission of new states. Hence
citizens of the United States who migrate to a territory of the United
States could not be treated as colonists. Whatever territory the
federal government annexes "it acquires for the benefit of the people of the several States who created it. It is their trustee, acting
for them, and charged with the duty of promoting the interests of
the whole people of the Union in the exercise of the powers specifically
granted."9 9 The power to acquire territory, Taney grudgingly conceded, carried with it the power to establish a government for it,
and with respect to the form of government he conceded to Congress
a broad discretion. However, when territory is acquired "the Federal government enters into possession in the character impressed
upon it . . . with its powers over the citizen strictly defined, and

limited by the Constitution"'0 0 in terms of express prohibitions, delegated powers, and the character of the Union as a federation "of

States, sovereign and independent within their own limits . .. and

bound together by a general government, possessing certain enumerated and restricted powers."'u 0
In the process of his argument Taney quoted but misconstrued
Marshall's opinion in American Ins. Co. v. Canter'0 2 where it was
made clear that whatever the source from which Congress derives
99. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450. The argument that territory can be acquired
only for the purpose of forming one or more states was perhaps not wholly
consistent with the aspirations of pro-slavery imperialists to acquire territory
that would have required long tutelage to become a state if indeed it ever
would have; but after all there was little consistency in the constitutional
arguments of either side in the agitation over slavery.
100. Id. at 449.
101. Id. at 447-48.
102. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
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the power to govern territories it is unquestionable. However, as regards federal authority Marshall and Taney had their own different
definitions of the power to govern; and with respect to territory Taney
used his cherished concept of dual sovereignty to limit federal power
to acquire it and to govern it afterwards. In any event he limited
the war and treaty powers as sources of power to acquire territory by
what Justice Holmes once called the "invisible radiation from the
general terms of the 10th amendment"' 03 and emasculated the power
of Congress to govern territories which in the last analysis is as broad
within a territory as that of a legislature is within a state. In so
doing he ignored Marshall's admonition against construing the Constitution as though it were a deed or a contract and repudiated some
of his own conceptions of governmental power and the adaptation
of the Constitution to the growth of the country and technological
developments. The consequenees to the'Court over which he presided
were disastrous. To protect slavery, Taney performed an act of judicial
immolation from which the Court did not recover until approximately
a quarter of a century later when it aligned itself with the rising
industrial oligarchy as the guardian of the kind of property Taney
would have liked least.
CONCLUSION
Two major themes characterize Taney's constitutional opinions. One
has to do with the power and duty of government, primarily the
state governments, actively to legislate for the health, happiness, and
welfare of all the people. The other is the theme of dual sovereignty
with emphasis upon a limitation of national power. The first theme
has such corollaries as beliefs in progress, in the adaptation of law
to new conditions, in the limitations of the judicial power to decide
issues of social policy, and hence in the competence and power of the
legislature. The second theme with its emphasis on a precise line
of demarcation between national and state power subject to judicial
determination under an unchanging Constitution has as its corollaries
conceptions of inactive government at the national level, of a static
and conceptualistic jurisprudence, of the omnicompetence of the federal judiciary, and of a Congress of narrowly contracted powers.
The first theme was and in a real sense continues to be a prophecy
of reform; the second for a long time was a prophecy of reaction as regards judicial interpretation and continues to be such in a political
context.
As a judicial spokesman of Jacksonian reform Taney laid the foundations of the police power and the welfare state. As a spokesman of reaction he contributed to the erection of a superstructure of constitutional limitations which long after his death was to obstruct
103. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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Congress in its efforts to regulate the national economy characterized
by clusters of concentrated economic power greater than that ever
possessed by the United States Bank,'04 and to hamper national attempts to mitigate the conditions of labor. 10 5 Moreover, by infusing the
due process clause with a substantive content as a limit upon congressional power he contributed in part to the conversion of due
process into an instrument for the judicial veto of state legislation
enacted in pursuance of the police power. 106 To be sure Taney could
hardly have anticipated the consequences of his doctrines, and if
he had he would hardly have approved of some of the uses to which
they were put. After all, Taney, in emphasizing states rights, did
believe in the active exercise of state powers and in this respect was
intellectually remote from those antagonists of governmental power
who later used the tenth amendment to constrict national power and,
simultaneously, the fourteenth to restrict state power over the same
subject matter. His basic error in this respect was his confidence in the
capacity of the state governments to control large segments of economic power which like the Bank challenged the authority of all
government, national and state. In relying upon state power for
executing most of the great tasks of government Taney lacked the
tough realism which was characteristic of his thought on the Bank
and corporate charters.
To say that Taney was a prophet of reform and reaction is to speak
in terms of paradox; but Taney's life and career were in many respects a paradox, both personally and officially. As a Catholic educated at a Presbyterian college, he imbibed the tenets of each religious
faith, and his political beliefs reflected the influence of each. However, in his belief in material progress, his lack of sympathy, except
in an abstract way, for paupers, slaves and other submerged persons,
he was closer to the man from Geneva and the Puritan than to the
Catholic ethic. Similarly, his lack of concern for the natural law was
not Catholic. Emphasis upon the positive law led in turn to a
neglect of natural rights and personal liberty. Taney's only concern
for personal liberty is reflected in his opinions on Lincoln's conduct
of the Civil War by the exercise of what he regarded as despotic military powers and his fear of the Bank as a threat to the liberty of the
104. The more notable dual federalism cases limiting congressional power
to regulate the economy under the commerce and taxing powers are: Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
105. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S. 20 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
106. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S.
522 (1923), and the line of cases following it; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466
(1898), and its progeny of cases, among others.
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people in a political context. Moreover, liberty like the right of
property, and other rights, was founded on the positive law. Physically
Taney combined extremely frail health with excessive longevity,
and physical frailty contributed to an asceticism in his private life
and his judicial utterances. As a descendant of an indentured servant
he did not care to have many more like his ancestor enter the country.
As a man of a reticent and retiring nature he lived much of his long
life in the spotlight of public controversy which he did not relish,
but from which he did not shrink.
As a jurist he made significant innovations in constitutional law
without destroying its continuity and he supplemented Marshall's
work in such a way that much of constitutional law ever since has
been based upon the respective foundations laid by these two Chief
Justices, sometimes the foundations of Marshall, sometimes those of
Taney, and sometimes those of each in combination. Although it
would be oversimplification and even exaggeration to say that constitutional interpretation after 1937 has been nothing more than a
blend of Marshall's and Taney's views on national power and social
legislation respectively, it is true that since 1937 the Court has generally followed Marshall in its conceptions of national power and
Taney when he spoke as the prophet of reform. Marshall and Taney
were great Chief Justices in their separate ways, but each lived long
enough to corroborate at least partially Justice Holmes' harsh dictum
10 7
that "all society rests on the death of men.
107. 1 HoLMEs-LAsKI
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